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Guest Editorial
Salutations, reasoners. I’m delighted to be guest editor for this
issue, featuring an interview with the man, the myth, the leg-
end, Kenny Easwaran. Kenny is a newly-minted Professor of
Philosophy at Texas A&M University. He was previously As-
sistant Professor at the University of Southern California, and
more previously a postdoc at the Australian National Univer-
sity, and yet more previously he earned a PhD from the Group
in Logic and the Methodology of Science at UC Berkeley.
Kenny’s worked on just about every subject under The Rea-
soner’s purview, but his specialties are epistemology (both
formal and original-flavor), logic and philosophy of math-
ematics. He accumulated a somewhat frightening number
of accolades soon after finishing his PhD, including hav-
ing papers chosen in two consecutive years for The Philoso-
pher’s Annual “ten best philosophy articles of the year”
list. (Those were “Decision Theory without Representa-
tion Theorems” in 2014, published in Philosophers’ Imprint,
and “Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worry-
ing and Love Bayesian Probabilities” in 2015, published in
Noûs.) Anyone interested in the social epistemology of math
should know Kenny’s work too: his “Probabilistic Proofs
and Transferability” (Philosophia Mathematica, 2009) and
“Rebutting and Undercutting in Mathematics” (Philosophi-
cal Perspectives, 2015) are classics and personal favorites.
Kenny and I first crossed paths
at a conference in Paris while I
was a grad student. He joined
my dissertation committee a little
after that. Fortunately, Kenny is
an easy person to keep in touch
with: just go to any random phi-
losophy conference and there’s a
63% chance he’s there. As you’ll
see from our interview, he’s a terri-
bly interesting person and a credit
to the profession. I’m happy to of-
fer you his opinions on fractal mu-
sic, Zoom conferences, being a good referee, teaching in math
and philosophy, the rationalist community and its relationship
to academia, decision-theoretic pluralism, and the city of Man-
hattan, Kansas.
William D’Alessandro
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Munich
Features
Interview with Kenny Easwaran
William D’Alessandro: Let’s start with an easy one: your
name. I’ve witnessed lots of confusion about how to pronounce
‘Easwaran’. How do you say it? What range of pronunciations
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are you willing to tolerate?
Kenny Easwaran: I mainly say
“EES-warren”. The name itself is
a Sanskrit word that, in Hindu reli-
gious contexts, is often transcribed
as “ishvara”, and is most used as
an epithet of Shiva, but Wikipedia
tells me that some polytheistic
Hindus that are devoted to one of
the deities use this term as an epi-
thet for that deity, and monotheis-
tic Hindus that see all the deities
as aspects of one supreme being
use the term as an epithet for that.
Most Indian languages have three separate consonants in the
space where English just has “s” and “sh”, and the second
phoneme of the name is that middle one. They also mostly only
have one consonant in the space where English has “w” and
“v”, and the third phoneme is that middle one. I unfortunately
have never learned any Tamil (my father’s family language) or
Sanskrit, so I’ve never learned a more natural pronunciation
of the name, and am happy with any approximation that isn’t
overly hesitant.
WD: You studied philosophy, math and music as an under-
grad at Stanford before joining the Logic and Methodology of
Science PhD program at Berkeley. What role does music play
in your life these days? Are you a musician yourself?
KE: In undergrad, I was playing violin and piano, and doing
some music theory and composition, including some electronic
sound generation. My last major project like that I eventually
put on YouTube. Unfortunately, some time in grad school, I lost
time for that, and my musical activities were mainly limited to
regular attendance at the opera and symphony in San Francisco
and then Los Angeles, and then even that is much less common
since I moved to Texas.
WD: You’re a conference guy—you’ve talked in the past
about how much you enjoy and rely on professional meetings
as opportunities to stay connected with the field. How have
you dealt with a year of canceled or Zoomified conferences? If
in-person meetings are a rarer commodity going forward, what
should we do to make the best of it?
KE: I’ve attended a bunch of online events, with varying
degrees of success. Probably the best part has been schedul-
ing recurring one-on-one Zoom calls with friends I’ve wanted
to spend more time with, that live in different parts of the
world, and having monthly Zoom get-togethers with some of
my high school friends who are scattered. I’ve been impressed
with what some of the grad students at Texas A&M have been
doing—it started as a biweekly reading group, and then started
inviting speakers to give work-in-progress talks, and then has
gradually accumulated a few regular visitors that have no af-
filiation with our university and is developing a bit of a com-
munity. I think it’s hard to make things work well online when
the group gets too big, unless you have smaller sub-groups that
chat regularly. There’s a lot that we miss when we can’t be
in the same room as each other, but there are many new op-
portunities we should all try to take advantage of to develop
global networks of people that share our interests, or our ways
of thinking, or that productively challenge us.
WD: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
named you its inaugural Referee of the Year in 2019. That’s
awesome! What’s distinctive about your approach to referee-
ing? What do you think the average philosopher could do to
elevate their referee game?
KE: Thanks! The main distinctive thing is that I do a lot of
refereeing—I think this is a way that I am best able to serve
the community, more than various administrative roles or my
own research. But the main thing I’m trying to do is figure out
how the author can make their paper more useful for a wider
audience. My most common suggestions tend to involve mak-
ing sure the first couple paragraphs show why not just people
who agree with your views should read the paper, but what your
opponents might find interesting about it as well. Think about
what you’re doing when you scan the literature for arguments
relevant to your point, and how you can make your paper catch
the eye of someone doing that.
As a referee, I think it’s also important to think about how
to identify papers that will be useful to the field, and how to
make marginal cases more useful. Being right or wrong about
the substance isn’t so important—it’s about whether the pa-
per has an interesting or important idea that people will care
about discussing, and that won’t cause more obfuscation than
illumination. I take notes all the way through reading the pa-
per, mentioning both typos and thoughts I’m having along the
way. I usually give all of these to the author, and try to be clear
about which are issues they have to address, and which (usually
most) should be taken as idiosyncratic responses of one possi-
ble reader, that they should be aware of when deciding how to
make this paper most helpful to many readers.
WD: In a post on your old blog, you described your views
on the ontology of mathematics as a contest between some
version of fictionalist nominalism and some version of neo-
Pythagoreanism, combined with occasional confusion about
what exactly the question is supposed to be. (I happen to share
this combination of sympathies.) How if at all have your views
evolved in recent years?
KE: I think that aspect of my views hasn’t changed too much.
I think the biggest development in my views here is that I’ve de-
veloped a renewed interest in programs like Field’s nominalist
program, but instead of thinking of it as saying something im-
portant about whether or not mathematical objects have their
own existence, I take the importance to be in showing that the
areas where mathematics is applied have their own existence
that doesn’t depend on the mathematics in any way. This is
how I’m thinking about the foundations of Bayesianism and de-
cision theory, and in a new project also consequentialist ethics.
I think we often get caught up in doing the calculations, and
forget to say what it is that makes the calculations relevant—
whether or not giving that explanation tells us that we should or
shouldn’t believe in the mathematical entities themselves seems
like a question I’m not as interested in as giving the explanation
itself.
WD: Would you mind saying more about the new conse-
quentialism project?
KE: In the earlier paper, I show that if one assumes that there
is a numerical scale for value, and a numerical scale for proba-
bility, and if one assumes that one option is better than another
when it yields a more valuable outcome in every state of the
world than the other, and if one assumes that two options are
equally good when they differ only in states of the same proba-
bility, and by equal values in opposite directions, then one can
conclude that out of two options with well-defined expected
values, the one with a higher expected value is better. The for-
mula involved in the calculation of expected value is a reliable
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way of telling which of two options is better, but the explana-
tion of why it is better is more intrinsic.
In the new project, I also add rules for saying two options
are equally good when there are counterbalancing trade-offs for
different people. It gets the consequence that in a finite popu-
lation, an option is better when the sum of the values for the
individuals is higher, but again, it is the goodness for the indi-
viduals that makes it better, not this sum itself (as we can see,
because the model makes coherent claims about infinite pop-
ulations, where there is no such thing as the sum). I certainly
don’t claim to have addressed any substantive ethical objec-
tions to consequentialism, but I avoid objections that are based
on reading too much into the mathematics.
WD: As someone who’s often taken (and occasionally
taught) both math and philosophy classes at the same time, I’ve
always been struck by the big differences between the two dis-
ciplines’ approaches to teaching. You’ve seen and done lots of
both too. Do you think philosophy instructors can learn any-
thing from math teaching, or is our field right to eschew the
chalk-and-talk approach?
KE: Some of the differences seem to me more essential than
others. One big difference is that mathematicians are more
likely to work visually, while philosophers are more likely to
work linguistically. That makes the use of the board often valu-
able in different ways in math, that might not be easily trans-
ferred to philosophy. But there are of course a range of ways
math gets taught. I’ve had some professors that write out the-
orems and proofs on the board as if it were on paper, which
really isn’t any good, while others use it for more diagrams and
pictures, with just some significant definitions and statements
as text. Some classes are taught in a more “inquiry-based”
manner, where it’s just a series of problems and exercises for
the students to work through and teach themselves the subject,
which I think is a useful approach when it can be done. (I’ve
been developing a series of notes like this for ZFC set theory.)
One thing that I was thinking about yesterday in conversation
with an undergrad was about the possibility of undergraduate
research opportunities. In the sciences, these are often easy to
design, because a faculty research project can often use more
hands in the lab, with the undergraduate educational experience
being a natural byproduct. But mathematicians also tend to
do a good job of designing undergraduate research opportuni-
ties for their students, despite not having labor-intensive work.
Philosophers very rarely provide such opportunities, and I think
we should try to understand better how mathematicians are able
to do it effectively, since I suspect there are relevant similarities.
WD: OK, I should ask something about reasoning before my
mic gets cut off. In recent work, you’ve advocated for view-
ing alternative decision theories less as competing accounts of
a single notion of rationality, and more as complementary ac-
counts reflecting different possible intervention points in the
decision process. I like this idea! What sort of reception has
it gotten so far?
KE: Oddly, although that article has been available on the
Synthese website since mid-2019, the journal also still says it
is forthcoming. I think this is because it’s in a special issue
that grew out of a conference at Cambridge several years ago,
and there are all sorts of reasons that special issues get held up
before they can officially make it into print. In any case, I had
the basic idea several years earlier (and discussed it on Julia
Galef’s podcast back in 2015), but I think it’s still too early to
say what the reception has been. The Cambridge conference
involved a bunch of philosophers who work on decision theory,
but also several researchers from the Centre for the Study of
Existential Risk, and the Machine Intelligence Research Insti-
tute, discussing a related set of issues about the implications of
being able to predict one’s own behavior for decision making.
The people at MIRI are interested in the decision theory that
an artificial intelligence that has the ability to inspect and mod-
ify its own source code would choose to self-implement. For
cases like the Newcomb problem, where being the sort of agent
that would predictably choose one box means that one would
get rewarded, they say that such an artificial intelligence would
choose one box (if its reasoning on start-up hadn’t already led
it to do that, it would have modified itself to be that sort of
agent). However, for cases like the “medical Newcomb prob-
lems”, where the correlation between one choice and a good
outcome is mediated by genetics, or something else prior to
the exercise of agency, there’s no reason such an agent would
make that choice. My idea was that where classical causal de-
cision theory investigates the results of intervening at the last
possible moment (and thus tells us to take the bonus box as
well), this decision theory investigates the results of interven-
ing as early as possible (and tells us to be the kind of person
that would just take one box). My thought is that neither of
these is “right”—they are just evaluating the rationality of dif-
ferent possible types of choice, and what is interesting about
human beings is that we have (fallible) abilities to make each
kind of choice (even if both kinds of decision are usually just
left up to our habits and aren’t subject to full self-control). I’ve
been told that similar ideas have been proposed in ethics, under
the heading of “global consequentialism”, but I’m still learning
more.
WD: Speaking of MIRI, the agenda and personnel there
overlap with those of the larger “rationalist” community—
some of whose stars include writers like Scott Alexander and
Eliezer Yudkowsky, and who are broadly interested in how to
think and decide well. In spite of the apparent shared inter-
ests, my sense is that these folks don’t interact much with aca-
demic epistemologists, philosophers of science and decision
theorists. But you seem to be an exception! (Julia Galef, whom
you mentioned, is another one: her podcast co-host was the
philosopher Massimo Pigliucci.) Do you have any thoughts
about the relationship between these two communities of aspir-
ing reasoners—either what it is or what it should be?
KE: I think there is growing interaction among these com-
munities. This “rationalist” world also encompasses the Effec-
tive Altruism movement, many of whose leaders are academic
philosophers (Peter Singer) or have PhDs in philosophy (Will
MacAskill, Toby Ord). Within the AI safety end of things, there
are fewer trained philosophers, but they spend a lot of time
looking at the literature on the Newcomb problem, and other
similar problem cases from Derek Parfit. In addition to myself,
several other philosophers have interacted with them, including
a paper co-authored by philosopher Ben Levinstein and MIRI
director Nate Soares. There is also an excellent paper, ”Log-
ical Induction”, that several of these researchers have written,
which I think represents one of the best advances on the prob-
lem of logical omniscience for Bayesianism in several decades,
though I don’t know that it has been published by an academic
journal.
This community does not fit nicely into established academic
disciplines, and even operates largely outside of academia. But
I think they, and some of us, have been getting better at learn-
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ing how to interact productively across these lines. I’m not
sure whether they are having more or less success at interacting
with other relevant academic disciplines like computer science,
psychology, and economics. But I hope that with their contin-
ued development, we get more interesting thought about these
issues, and also learn more about the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the academic vs. para-academic form of organization.
WD: When you’re not writing about philosophy or referee-
ing everyone else’s writing about philosophy, you have lots of
thoughts about city infrastructure, transportation and other as-
pects of urban planning (including a 2019 article about ratio-
nality as applied to cities). What are your favorite and least
favorite cities in the world?
KE: One way the pandemic has been very strange for me is
the way it has both cut me off from visiting many cities, and
also drastically changed the ways in which cities function. In
that paper, I describe a city as a collection of people that, by
virtue of the fact of being located geographically close enough
to each other, have many shared interests—in particular, al-
though the people in a city are extremely diverse and have very
different fundamental values and goals in life, they all need to
get around town to achieve those goals, and the effectiveness
of their ability to get around is at least partly constituted by
the behavior of everyone else in getting around, including so-
cial norms like standing on one side of escalators to let peo-
ple walk, or allowing left-turners to run a red light at the end
of a cycle (as in Los Angeles) or the beginning (as in Pitts-
burgh). What I didn’t imagine when writing that paper was
that I would live through several months where I barely inter-
acted with that transportation infrastructure—everything from
dinner with friends to classes to board game night to philosophy
conferences would take place inside my own home, through a
computer.
This is all just to say, I don’t know what almost any city
is like these days. I know from reading the news and talk-
ing to friends online that this change has happened extremely
differently in different cities—in Australia, many things have
returned to nearly the Before Times, while I have friends in
New York that spent many months without setting foot outside
their apartment. I have basically only seen College Station and
Austin in this new state, and not any of the ways that other
cities have transformed - though Austin has been an interest-
ing place to be, full of many people (like myself) that have
relocated here temporarily. Of course, some are here to get
away from crowded places back home, while others like me are
here precisely because it gives me the opportunity to see many
neighbors in the apartment building walking their dogs, while I
can get great takeout. But even within a city, this change in our
behavior has been extremely different for different people, with
only the small minority of people whose behavior has changed
least being highly visible in public.
As a final dodge of your question, I’ll say that for any cat-
egory of thing that I love, I find it impossible to pick a fa-
vorite. Probably Los Angeles was my favorite place to live,
with its combination of weather, multiculturalism, and at the
time I was living there, the rapid growth of bicycle and tran-
sit infrastructure. But I constantly find myself thinking back to
several memorable places I went in the last few months before
travel stopped—particularly Singapore, Nashville, and Man-
hattan, Kansas.
WD: I’m pretty sure nobody has ever named those three
cities in the same sentence before. Why the Garden City, Music
City and the Little Apple in particular?
KE: Singapore is a city I’ve thought about a lot from the
perspective of governance—it’s at best a quasi-democratic so-
ciety, with powerful technocratic rule. In some ways this has
been great—it has brought millions of people from developing
economies the benefits of living in a modern developed econ-
omy; it is one of the few growing developed-world cities with
relatively affordable housing; it is every bit the paradise for de-
licious and affordable food that people say (for the rest of my
life I will always remember that masala dosa from the hawker
stand at the Harbourfront MRT station). But in many other
ways, it strikes an American as a kind of Disney/Vegas sterile
glitz, even ignoring the harms of the authoritarian governance
itself. I was very excited about transportation policy there, be-
cause I had heard they had a strict limit on automobiles on the
island—but in practice, the pedestrian realm is only slightly
better than that of New York or London, and the restrictions on
automobiles seem intended more to benefit the few that have
automobiles than to benefit the many pedestrians (though the
transit system has grown quite effective).
Nashville is a city that is undergoing a major boom like
Austin, and I was excited to see what that means. Whole neigh-
borhoods full of many thousands of residents have been con-
structed on former industrial land in The Gulch, near down-
town. There is more new construction per capita than any other
North American city, and even more than Austin, there is a
booming bachelorette party industry, which has the interest-
ing result that many public spaces that would be dominated
by loud, drunk men in other cities are instead dominated by
loud, drunk women. It’s the first place I got to spend several
days using pay-per-minute electric scooters as my main mode
of transportation.
I found Manhattan interesting primarily for its physical
geography—it’s surprisingly quite hilly, as the area where the
Kansas River cuts down out of the high uplifted plains of the
west before getting to the lower floodplains of the Missouri and
Mississippi River. But the most memorable part is primarily
that I was there around February 20, 2020. As you note, I’m
quite a conference guy, so I did go to several conferences in
the next two weeks, but those were in Madison, Chicago, and
Princeton, which are places that I have far more memories of
that aren’t shaped by the oddities of that moment in time.
WD: If you could change one thing about philosophy as a
profession, what would it be?
KE: The thing I find myself thinking most about these days
is the strange disconnect between the way we find our employ-
ment through a particular department in a particular college or
university, and the way we live so much of our professional
lives attached to a geographically dispersed body of researchers
and friends. In this strange moment, when we are physically
just as separated from the people whose office is just next door
to our office as from people on the other side of the world,
it often seems particularly arbitrary that some of us work un-
der one set of policies and others under another set. Not that
it would be better for all universities to be absorbed into one
mega-institution with global policies or anything like that, but
there would be something nice about each of us being able to
set up our own cross-cutting groups of scholars that work to-
gether, with students from around the world.
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Tonk and Scepticism
Arthur Prior (1960: “The Runabout Inference Ticket”, Analy-
sis, 21: 38-39) introduced his (in)famous connective “tonk” to
highlight a number of issues including what constitutes a log-
ical connective and what constitutes a justification of logical
laws. But, in particular, “tonk” was taken to show the problem-
atic nature of an inferentialist approach to impute the truth of
logical laws to the meanings of logical vocabularies whose def-
initions are given in terms of some deducibility rules. More re-
cently, however, it has been argued by Paul Boghossian (2001:
“How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?”, Philosoph-
ical Studies, 106: 1-40) that the problem of “tonk” goes beyond
the problem of justifying deduction and can be easily extended
to the larger issue of global epistemological scepticism: viz.
how there could be objectively correct epistemic principles of
any kind. Basically, so goes the argument, if deduction is in
trouble for its justification, given the ineluctable involvement
of deductive reasoning in any account of how we might know
the correctness of any non-deductive epistemic principles, then
there arises the spectre of global epistemological scepticism.
To stave off global scepticism, Boghossian mounts a defense
of deduction by arguing against the legitimacy of “tonk” type
connectives as they apparently fail to be truth-preserving. The
argument is buttressed by the semantic stipulation that there
must be a semantic value for any logical constant which makes
its corresponding inferential laws truth-preserving. In other
words, “tonk” is not only not truth-preserving but also mean-
ingless. However, given the deductive nature of the argument,
Boghossian readily concedes the circularity of the reasoning
but contends that the rule-circularity involved in the argumen-
tation is of a virtuous than a vicious variety. The rest of this
brief is, therefore, an outline of some critical concerns about
Boghossian’s contention. (I) If rule-circularity is permissible
in the justification of deduction, why cannot the same latitude
be shown towards inductive justification of induction? Indeed,
there has been a renewed flurry of justifying induction à la Hans
Reichenbach through meta-induction and optimality. ( Schurz,
G., 2019: Hume’s Problem Solved: The Optimality of Meta-
induction, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) Thus, there appears
to be no cause for global scepticism. (II) Notwithstanding the
rule-circularity issue, in view of the existence of many com-
peting and mutually exclusive deductive systems, one is left in
dark as to how to choose between them. Boghossian’s where-
withal to justify deduction is not sufficiently discriminatory to
adjudicate among such competing deductive calculi. (III) In
pursuit of his meaning-theoretic concerns, Boghossian appeals
to the forgoing semantic stipulation to delegitimize “tonk” type
connectives. Yet, what exactly is the status of such meaning
stipulations? That is, would not an appeal to such constraints
embroil one either in a vicious circle or in an infinite regress?
This seems to be somewhat reminiscent of Lewis Carroll’s
(1895: “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles”, Mind, 4: 278-280)
famous dialogue between the tortoise and Achilles. (IV) More-
over, the imposition of the semantic stipulation on the construc-
tion of any logical framework seems to blur the boundaries be-
tween logicality and meaningfulness of connectives. It can be
shown that there are perfectly decent logical connectives that
can operate in the absence of such semantic constraints: that
is, though such cases are unhelpful by obscuring the meaning
of those connectives, the absence of the semantic stipulation
neither engenders incoherence nor renders their rules incapable
of defining the meaning of the connectives as logical. (Read,
S., 2008: “Harmony and Modality”, in Dialogues, Logics, and
Other Strange Things, ed. C. DÈgremont et al., London: Col-
lege Publications) (V) Furthermore, the converse of the preced-
ing point about Boghossian’s possibly unintended blurring of
the boundaries between logicality and meaningfulness can be
expressed in the form of the following question: why should
the mere possession of semantic value be sufficient to figure
in valid patterns of inference? A poignant example here is
Frege’s problematic principle, Basic Law V, involving the term
ı̀extensionı̂ that ultimately led to the discovery of Russell’s
Paradox. (VI) There have been attempts at exploring the pos-
sibility of contexts where the addition of tonk would not lead
to absurdity and failure of truth-preservation. The attempts can
be divided into two broad categories: syntactical as in R. Cook
(2005: “What’s Wrong with Tonk(?)”, Journal of Philosophi-
cal Logic, 34: 217-226), Y. Maruyama (2016: ëPriorı́s Tonk,
Notions of Logic, and Levels of Inconsistencyı́, Synthese, 193:
3483-3495), D. Ripley (2015: “Anything Goes”, Topoi, 34: 25-
36) and P. Teijeiro (2020: “Not a Knot”, Thought, 9: 14-24), or
semantical as in Ripley (2015) and J. Warren (2015: “Talking
with Tonkers”, Philosophersı́ Imprint, 15 (24): 1-24). (VII) It
seems that the grounds for the virtuous rule-circularity claim in
Boghossianı́s argument include inter alia an espousal of non-
crude externalism which presumably provides an opportunity
to break out of the vicious circle of internalism that relies on a
priori reasoning, self-knowledge, or reflection. The idea here
seems to be that we can acquire a warrant for an inference de-
spite its circularity since it is not required for us antecedently
to possess a reflectively appreciable warrant for that inference
rule. Thus, in line with externalism, the requirement to first
reflectively acknowledge the truth-preserving nature of the in-
ference to be warranted is obviated. Now, besides the consider-
able concerns surrounding externalism, the critical question to
ask in the context of logic is: does an external warrant furnish a
proper and apposite ground for justifying logical laws? Specif-
ically, does not externalism deprive logic of its most cherished
and cardinal characteristic, namely, necessity? (VIII) In con-
trast to Boghossian’s method, another approach to solving the
problem of justification for both deduction and induction has
been to claim the need for a disambiguation in the concept of
justification. It is contended that there are at least two senses
of justification here: justification simpliciter (my term) and jus-
tification relative to a cognitive end, and the problem of justi-
fication of deduction and induction concerns the latter not the
former which can be overcome inductively for deduction and
deductively for induction. (Huber, F., 2017: “On the Justifi-
cation of Deduction and Induction”, European Journal for Phi-
losophy of Science, 7: 507-534) Although the approach fails
to appeal to justification purists, at least it is not more problem-
atic than Boghossianı́s. (IX) Finally, Boghossian’s rule-circular
justification of deduction diverges drastically from the histori-
cal emergence and treatment of the issue. Specifically, it flies
against the earliest extant attempt at such a justification by Aris-
totle in his Metaphysics ? Aristotle’s method of elenchus (neg-
ative proof or proof by refutation) in his version of the justifica-
tion of deduction brings the problematic nature of Boghossianı́s






Pursuitworthiness in Scientific Inquiry: special issue of Stud-
ies of History and Philosophy of Science, Part A, deadline 1
May.
Classic Methodologies in the Philosophy of Science: special
issue of Journal for General Philosophy of Science, deadline
30 April.
What’s Hot in . . .
Science Policy
11th of February is the Interna-
tional Day of Women and Girls
in Science. This was an occasion
to cherish female researchers and
the improvements towards equal-
ity, but also to remind ourselves
that there is still a lot of work
ahead of us. One important as-
pect that we should focus on is the
fact that we are still witnessing dis-
crimination against LGBTQ+ sci-
entists. For instance, Cech and
Waidzunas (2021, Science Advances 7, eabe0933) showed
that LGBTQ+ scientists experience career limitations, men-
tal health difficulties, and are more likely to leave natural sci-
ences. Moreover, we should keep in mind that the distinc-
tion between genders is fluid and respect the personal choices
in this matter. Apart from radical problems such as sexual
harassment, there are many other reasons why female scien-
tists might feel uncomfortable at their workplace. They re-
port lower satisfaction with their jobs and face more obstacles
when it comes to career advancements in academia. These dif-
ferences in treatment go very deep. Studies even show that
women on average get less physical office space than men
(http://museum.mit.edu/150/71).
Gender balance is not achieved by a simple numerical pro-
portion. Even in a situation when the number of male and fe-
male researchers is equal, it is very important to check what
is the dominant communication culture in a field or research
group. In academic cultures that are designated as aggressive
or masculine, female researchers will feel discouraged to ex-
press their opinions, and thus participate less with their ideas in
the scientific discourse. This has negative consequences to the
whole community as a diversity of opinions, approaches, and
experiences enriches science.
The role of men in achieving a balanced and inclusive en-
vironment is very important. The positive example of Pierre
Curie is an inspiration to us all. He supported Marie Curie’s
scientific success and even wrote a letter announcing that she
deserves scientific credit when he was considered for a Nobel
Prize (Pycior 1993, Social Studies of Science 23(2) 301-323).
Men can always use their voices to promote women in society
and act in supportive ways.
The COVID-19 crisis brought to light another aspect of in-
equality between female and male researchers: the traditional
picture of females spending more time with children than males
reflected itself in the scientific output of female scientists dur-
ing the school and kindergarten lockdown (Gewin 2020, Na-
ture 583, 867-869). More active participation of men in home
duties, equal distribution of obligations, and time spent with
children would help to overcome such scenarios in the future.
Inclusion is the dynamic adaptation of the dominant environ-
ment and its shift towards a balanced one. This means shifting
the dominant culture in science to a more open, less authori-
tarian, and more tolerant one. In return, not only that the ideas
of underprivileged scientists will be more prominent, but the
community and work environment will be more pleasant for





As its name suggests, Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM)
is a medical methodology relying on evidence, where,
traditionally, this evidence is a statistical correlation be-
tween a disease and its cause established through associ-
ation studies like clinical or observational trials and con-
firmed through systematic review and meta-analysis e.g., How-
ick (2011: The Philosophy of Evidence-Based Medicine).
However, more recently, evi-
dence of a mechanism linking the
disease and its cause has been
added to the EBM approach (e.g.,
on EBM+, Parkkinen, Wallmann,
Wilde, Clarke, Illari, Kelly, Nor-
rell, Russo, & Williamson. Eval-
uating Evidence of Mechanisms in
Medicine: Principles and Proce-
dure 2018, and Hauker-Howlett, &
Wilde, “Reinforced Reasoning in
Medicine”, 2020, Journal of Eval-
uation in Clinical Practice 26: 458-464). How much useful is
EBM+ with respect to the new SARS-CoV-2 pandemic? This
question has attracted, and is still attracting, a lot of scholars
and scientists from many diverse backgrounds. The interna-
tionally reputed Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice has
very recently included a certain number of papers addressing
this question. Among those papers, one can find the follow-
ing multi-authored paper: Aronson, Hauker-Howlett, Ghiara,
Kelly, & Williamson, “The Use of Mechanistic Reasoning in
Assessing Coronavirus Interventions”, Journal of Evaluation in
Clinical Practice, forth. In this paper, the authors argue that,
when assessing causal claims in the case of an infectious dis-
ease like COVID-19, it is insufficient to rely merely on associ-
ation studies; clinicians must also rely on mechanistic reason-
ing. In a nutshell, COVID-19 is here used as an example for
the fruitfulness of an EBM+ approach, which combines asso-
ciation and mechanistic studies.
The authors’ main line of argumentation is as follows: (i) the
reliance on association studies for assessing the effectiveness of
causal interventions on the coronavirus disease is insufficient,
for “[. . . ] correlation is insufficient for causation: a correlation
may be attributable to chance, bias, uncontrolled confounders,
inappropriately controlled colliders, or relationships other than
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causation” (p. 2); (ii) coupling association studies with mecha-
nistic reasoning is beneficial to the research on COVID-19, for,
“[. . . ] if an established mechanism links [. . . ] two variables, it
may be possible to regard [. . . ] biases as less plausible expla-
nations of the observed association on COVID-19 outcomes”
(p. 4).
From this, one can raise, at a general level, two related
challenges. First, by associating into a single methodological
framework, namely EBM+, both association studies and mech-
anistic ones, it seems that EBM+ ultimately relies on two op-
posing – rather than complementary or merely compatible - the-
ories of causation. Indeed, as a certain medical methodology,
EBM+ is based on certain metaphysical presuppositions about
causation: (i) the idea that we come to know a causal relation-
ship in medicine through association studies very likely relies
on an agency or counterfactual theory of causation, which ana-
lyzes causation in terms of manipulability (e.g. Pearl, Causal-
ity: Models, Reasoning, and Inference, 2009); (ii) the idea that
we come to know a causal relationship through evidence of an
underlying mechanism obviously relies on a metaphysical the-
ory of causation as a mechanism relating a cause to its effect
(e.g. Glennan, 1996, “Mechanisms and the Nature of Causa-
tion”, Erkenntnis 44: 49-71).
Can we coherently reconcile presuppositions (i) and (ii) into
a single methodological framework? Or, do we have to go
along a strong pluralist way by arguing that presuppositions
(i) and (ii) cannot be unified (even minimally)? What is clear,
at least here, is that agency or counterfactual theories of causa-
tion and mechanistic ones have been historically developed as
two competing and (seemingly) irreconcilable theories of cau-
sation, where the former focuses on possible worlds, while the
latter on the actual world.
A second related challenge on EBM+, in all its generality,
is that we may wonder whether mechanistic studies are even-
tually not sufficient by themselves to assess causal claims in
medicine. Indeed, cannot we consider association studies as
means to know of a mechanism, that it to say to get evidence
about, actually, an underlying mechanism? In that sense, it is
not the case that association studies are supplemented by mech-
anistic reasoning, but that mechanistic reasoning - under a very
strong sense (Aronson et al. (forth.)), thus - is supplemented by
association studies establishing through a statistical correlation
between two variables, so to say, the boundaries of the mecha-
nism in question. Furthermore, the suggestion that mechanistic
reasoning is to be put primary would also solve the first chal-
lenge raised here, for EBM(+) would ultimately rely on a single
metaphysical theory of causation.
Despite those challenges raised here, the EBM+ approach
certainly has a bright future ahead. Evidence of it: wonder-
ful forthcoming workshops at the University of Kent, namely
“Analogical Reasoning in Philosophy and Science” on 28
May 2021 (Analogical Reasoning Workshop (Kent, 2021)
(shanyafeng.com)), and “Alternative Approaches to Causation:
Beyond Difference-making and Mechanism” on 28-29 June
2021” (Causation Conference (Kent, 2021) (shanyafeng.com)),
as well as the online conference “Philosophy and Methodology
of Medicine” at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philoso-
phy (MCMP) on 1-3 June 2021 (Philosophy and Methodology
of Medicine (1-3 June 2021) - Munich Center for Mathematical
Philosophy (MCMP) - LMU Munich (uni-muenchen.de)); and
a special issue of the European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
on the philosophy of medicine with a submission deadline up
to March 31st 2021 (2nd CfP: Philosophy of Medicine, spe-
cial issue of EuJAP – European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
(uniri.hr)), with topics like the standards of evidence in public
health, causality and explanation in epidemiology, or epistemic
risks in epidemiological research. What great opportunities to






REPS: Reconsidering Empiricism in the Philosophy of Sci-
ence, virtual, 31 March.
April
SURe: Scientific Understanding and Representation, Nether-
lands, 15–17 April.
September
Progic: Combining Probability and Logic, Munich, Germany,
1–3 September.
CSPS: Congress of the Society for the Philosophy of Science,
University of Mons, Belgium, 8–10 September.
VoAS: The Varieties of Anti-Skepticism, Pamplona, Spain, 15–
17 September.
ECSQARU: European Conference on Symbolic and Quantita-
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sity of Barcelona.
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HPSM: MA in the History and Philosophy of Science and
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LoPhiSC: Master in Logic, Philosophy of Science and Epis-
temology, Pantheon-Sorbonne University (Paris 1) and Paris-
Sorbonne University (Paris 4).
Master Programme: in Artificial Intelligence, Radboud Uni-
versity Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
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MA in Cognitive Science: School of Politics, International
Studies and Philosophy, Queen’s University Belfast.
MA in Logic and the Philosophy ofMathematics: Department
of Philosophy, University of Bristol.
MA Programmes: in Philosophy of Science, University of
Leeds.
MA in Logic and Philosophy of Science: Faculty of Philosophy,
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MA in Logic and Theory of Science: Department of Logic of
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MA in Metaphysics, Language, and Mind: Department of Phi-
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MA inMind, Brain and Learning: Westminster Institute of Ed-
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MA in Rhetoric: School of Journalism, Media and Communi-
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and Philosophy of Mind and Psychology, University of Birm-
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MRes in Methods and Practices of Philosophical Research:
Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen.
MSc in Applied Statistics: Department of Economics, Mathe-
matics and Statistics, Birkbeck, University of London.
MSc in Applied Statistics and Datamining: School of Mathe-
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MSc in Artificial Intelligence: Faculty of Engineering, Uni-
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MSc in Cognitive& Decision Sciences: Psychology, University
College London.
MSc in Cognitive Systems: Language, Learning, and Reason-
ing, University of Potsdam.
MSc in Cognitive Science: University of Osnabrück, Germany.
MSc in Cognitive Psychology/Neuropsychology: School of
Psychology, University of Kent.
MSc in Logic: Institute for Logic, Language and Computation,
University of Amsterdam.
MSc in Mind, Language & Embodied Cognition: School of
Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of
Edinburgh.
MSc in Philosophy of Science, Technology and Society: Uni-
versity of Twente, The Netherlands.
MRes in Cognitive Science and Humanities: Language, Com-
munication and Organization: Institute for Logic, Cognition,
Language, and Information, University of the Basque Country
(Donostia San Sebastián).
OpenMind: International School of Advanced Studies in Cog-
nitive Sciences, University of Bucharest.
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Jobs and Studentships
Studentships
Doctoral Programme in Philosophy: Language, Mind and
Practice, Department of Philosophy, University of Zurich,
Switzerland.
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Professorship: in Philosophical Psychology, University of
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